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Abstract. Warning is a key issue to reduce ﬂash ﬂoods impacts. But, despite many studies, local and national
authorities still struggle to issue good ﬂash ﬂoods warnings. We will argue that this failure results from a
classical approach of warnings, based on a strict separation between the assessment world and the action
world. We will go further than the previous criticisms (Pielke and Carbone, 2002) and show that forecasters,
decision makers, emergency services and local population have quite similar practices during a ﬂash-ﬂood
warning. Focusing on the use of meteorological information in the warning process, our case study shows that
more research about the real practices of stakeholders would be another step towards integrated studies.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, ﬂash ﬂoods caused life and property
losses, all over the world (for example in France, 23 casu-
alties in the 2002 Gard event). Linked with extreme rainfall
events, ﬂash ﬂoods represent a major threat, likely to become
more important due to the anticipated climate change. In
western countries, many tools help to reduce ﬂash-ﬂoods im-
pacts: ﬂood control structures, education, land use planning,
warning... Among them, warning remains an eﬀective way
to reduce losses during ﬂash-ﬂoods.
Despite of the great improvement of the past 30 years,
ﬂash ﬂood warnings continue to be criticized for their ineﬃ-
ciency or inaccuracy (Sorensen, 2000). The September 2005
event in the Gard d´ epartement of France gave a new example
of these criticisms (Hornus and Martin, 2005).
Many studies emphasize the need for an integrated ap-
proach about the warning process, from forecast improve-
ments to societal issues (e.g. Demuth et al., 2007; Drobot
and Parker, 2007). Indeed the so-called classical warning
approach tends to separate the warning process into two dis-
tincts worlds, and thus misses a part of the warning process.
Our study of the ﬂash-ﬂood warning process in the Vidourle
catchment, in the Gard d´ epartement (South of France), al-
lows us to emphasize the need for an integrated approach
that rely on a common study framework for all stakeholders.
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In this paper, we will focus on the stakeholders’ use of
information issued by the French weather service “M´ et´ eo
France”, relying on the data from our thesis research. The
ﬁrst section deﬁnes the main characteristics of the “classical
approach”. The second section exposes our pragmatic study
of the warning process. Finally, our ﬁrst results showing the
interest of using the same framework for the study of all the
stakeholders of the warning process will be discussed.
2 Classical approach of warning
In general terms, a warning consists in providing enough
time for preventive actions (PA), before an event occurs. In
a way, the warning process is a “ime trial”, or a race against
the phenomenon. To win this race, and be able to conduct
PA, we need to anticipate and assess (making sense out of)
the situation. One who do not understand what is about to
happen, is unlikely to choose and take PA relevant for the
speciﬁc situation. The classical paradigm rely on:
The linear model postulate that “time slips away”, so the
available time before a ﬂood occurs is limited. Using the
potential warning time, Carsell et al. (2004) for instance as-
sume that some subprocesses have to be processed one after
the other: data collection, evaluation, notiﬁcation, decision
making, and then, preventive actions. In spite of many crit-
icisms (e.g. Pielke and Carbone, 2002), this linear model is
still dominant, especially in the French warning policy.
(At least) two worlds: modernity and technobureaucracy
gave us with some rules for the race, that rely on a strict sep-
aration between several worlds (Becker, 1984), caracterised
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Figure 1. The warning “race” and the French postulate.
by: their prerogative (forecasting/decision making, for in-
stance), their status (scientiﬁc/citizen), and their scale of ac-
tion (national/local). It implies that the people of one world
have similar ways to think or to act, and that they share the
same interests. This is the so-called classical approach which
distinguishes, at least, two worlds (Fig. 1b): 1) the assess-
ment world: scientists and national institutions are the sole in
charge of assessing the situation. 2) The action world: secu-
rity services, local oﬃcials, citizens have the responsability
of PA. Once scientists have provided information regarding
the threat, they have to conform to expected behaviours (se-
curity plans).
And a postulate: Underlying this classical French ap-
proach of warning, we can point at a strong postulate: should
people in charge of taking actions conform to expected be-
haviours, without wasting time trying to assess the situation
by themselves, time should be available in the upstream for
scientiﬁc assessment (Fig. 1c).
The most recent studies about ﬂash-ﬂood warnings un-
derline the need for an integrated approach, relying on a
closer connection between meteorological research and so-
cietal needs (e.g. Demuth et al., 2007; Stewart et al., 2004).
Still this integrated approach postulates the existence of two
separated worlds, which we question here.
3 Pragmatic framework for warning studies
Before leaning warning studies back against the classical
postulate, we should take into account what people actually
do, all along the warning process. We need to consider real
stakeholders’ practices. We chose to focus here on the way
stakeholders use the meteorological information (MI), which
is a real issue: weather forecasters are under a lot of pressure
when they assess a situation since it could determine what to
do next. During the ﬂash ﬂood warning process, each stake-
holder uses this initial information, in one way or another:
Do they use it for a further assessment of the situation? Do
they use it for undertaking preventive actions?
3.1 A pragmatic approach
To consider stakeholders’ warning practices, we propose to
use the pragmatic sociology framework (Nachi, 2006).
Our work is inspired by the trivial question “what do peo-
ple actually do?”. Warning is a process. So, our central pre-
occupation is the warning being processed by stakeholders
in context. The principles we take from pragmatic sociol-
ogy infers an approach which is: 1) integrated (Montz and
Gruntfest, 2002): warning must be considered from mete-
orological data acquisition to the warning response. That’s
why we consider that “stakeholder” means everyone who is
concerned, from the weather forecasters to the riverside res-
idents; 2) symmetric: in line with Sciences and Technology
Studies, we don’t make any hierarchy between scientiﬁc/non
scientiﬁc knowledges or tools. That does not mean they are
worth the same, but social scientists have to consider and
treat them equally; 3) diachronic: we try to grasp the dy-
namic and the temporal dimension of the warning process; 4)
characterised by a multi scales study area (national, regional,
departmental, little towns and riversides residents), to better
understand all the interactions in the Vidourle catchment.
3.2 Case study and methodology elements
In order to study how people actually use the MI along the
warning process, we used interviews conducted in 2007–
2008 as a part of a general study of ﬂash-ﬂood warning
process in the Vidourle basin. These interviews were con-
ducted with representatives of all stakeholders involved in
the warning process: weather and ﬂood forecasters and man-
agers, state representatives in the d´ epartement (le pr´ efet)
and chief of SIDPC (emergency manager at the d´ epartement
scale), mayors, riverside residents and shopkeepers, emer-
gency services, rural policemen, and private company pro-
viding decision-making support to mayors. More than eighty
interviews have been conducted, in diﬀerent places: Paris,
Toulouse, Aix-en-Provence, Nimes and in the Vidourle river-
side municipalities. Indeed, if the Vidourle ﬂoods a little
catchment, the warning process involves people from sev-
eral parts of France (Fig. 2). Thus, this study reﬂects both a
part of the French ﬂoods warning system, and some speciﬁc
aspects of the social organisation in the Vidourle catchment.
We primarily asked stakeholders: “How do you concretely
process the ﬂash-ﬂood warning?”. We were looking for: i)
the kind of information/data received or sought, ii) kind of
use of these informations (tools, interpretation frames), iii)
what (or who) determines the value of the information, iv)
impact of social interactions, v) How they do warn other peo-
ple.
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Figure 2. Many stakeholders, places and scales.
The following results rely on a qualitative analysis of
fourteen interviews, chosen for their representativity of each
scale and each kind of stakeholders.
Notice that M´ et´ eo France issues several signals and infor-
mations. We will focus on the use of two of them: 1) the
carte de vigilance, that pictures the forecast of dangerous hy-
drometeorological events for the next 24h, thanks to a colour
code (green, yellow, orange, and red for worst events), at the
d´ epartment scale. It is widely broadcasted (TV, Internet, ra-
dio, newspapers) 2) bulletins de pr´ ecipitations, detailling the
expected amount of precipitations for the next 24h, in rele-
vant areas for hydrologists. The latter are only sent to ﬂood
forecasters.
4 Results
In order to present graphically our results, we use a two-by-
two matrix considering assessment on the ﬁrst axis and PA
on the other. It allows to compare what should be the stake-
holders’ use of MI according to the classical approach and
the concrete manner stakeholders use MI (Fig. 3).
According to the classical postulate, there should be two
ways of using MI: people from the assesment world (in blue)
are expected to use MI to assess the threat, whereas people
from the action world (in green) are only expected to use MI
as a basis for the PA. Then we assigned to our fourteen stake-
holders some qualitative coordinates, according to what they
actually do with the MI: {important/average/little/none} as-
sessmentofsituationand{alotof/several/afew/none}PA.Fi-
nally, we placed our stakeholders in the matrix (red crosses).
It appears that the stakeholders’ practices debunk the classi-
cal postulate: most of them use the MI both to assess the
threat and to undertake PA
Figure 3. Warning practices: a base for integrated approach?
4.1 No assessment out of action
Assessment of the situation is always linked with action. Di-
rectly, as the forecasters draw cartes de vigilance, and TV
and radio warnings. Indeed, to issue the cartes de vigilance,
forecasters have to choose a colour for each d´ epartement:
green = no threat, yellow = threat for outdoor activities, or-
ange=threat for current activities, red = extreme threat for
people. This choice, in spite of the M´ et´ eo France oﬃcial dis-
course, does not rely only on a scientiﬁc assessment but is
also a matter of decision making: both weather and hydro
forecasters explained us how they actually consider political,
economical and territorial issues drawing the cartes de vigi-
lance. For instance, a previous missed warning or a conﬂict
with security agencies, touristic periods, or special meetings
such as the Grand Slam tennis tournament “Roland Garros”
may be a substantial part of the choice. More indirectly,
the forcasters take into account, all along the assessment
process, what they know (or believe) about PA and associ-
ated constraints. For instance, choosing the orange colour
for a d´ epartement means that the rescue operational center
(CODIS) has to be warned, the pr´ efet is supposed to open the
emergency operation centerr, radio France Bleu Gard Lozre
is supposed to follow a strict broadcast plan and people are
supposed to adapt their behaviours. The forecasters we met
were fully aware of their choices’ consequences. And we did
not meet any forecaster who decline to make choices and to
be a part of the preventive action.
4.2 No action without assessment
It seems to be impossible for people to undertake relevant PA
without making sense out of the situation. For instance, lo-
cal authorities (mayors and rural policemen) systematically
try to assess by themselves the situation. Indeed, MI informs
themaboutthegeneralsituationofthed´ epartement, butoften
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fails to assess their local threat. Yet, PA (to move property, to
close schools or highways, to evacuate populations, to shut
down factories) may have high economic, politic or social
costs. Local authorities are thus very careful, and seek, by
many ways, a really accurate assessment of their local situa-
tion. As a mayor said:
“Ireceivedthecartedevigilance... Igotmyboots
on, and I walked to the river...to have MY quick
look to Vidourle... Then, my team and I tought we
could wait for children to leave the school before
closing the roads.”
And a rural policeman told us: “I know Vidourle
for a long time... Sometimes, Vidourle ‘tells’ me
‘it comes’... and, when my family is threatened, I
trust this feeling more than the oﬃcial warning!”
Citizens whose preventive action consists in moving their car
to higher places still try to assess their situation: they call
the neighbourhood or relatives, or trusted local authorities,
in order to know what happens (waterlevel, precipitations up-
stream, for instance).
The two exceptions are very speciﬁc: we met a woman
who “waterproofed” her house after the 2002 ﬂood! When
she is aware of an “orange vigilance”, she pushes the button
linked to her pneumatic doors and windows, and the house
cannot be ﬂooded anymore. She does not care if a ﬂood ac-
tually occurs or not. The other one is a new rural policeman,
who does not know much about Vidourle and ﬂoods. So he
does exactly what the mayor wants him to do, without trying
to have an opinion about what is happening or not.
4.2.1 A common study framework
These results are consistent with previous integrated re-
searches (e.g. Drabek, 1999; Morss et al., 2005, 2008). But,
they also suggest that the practices of warning stakeholders
are not always consistent with the postulate of two worlds: in
our case, all stakeholders both assess the situation and under-
take PA. This new outcome has a ﬁrst methodological conse-
quence: we can (must) study all stakeholders with the same
analysis framework. Despite their various tools or capacities,
acommonframeworkwouldallowtocomparepractices. Ad-
ditional studies, in diﬀerent places and on diﬀerent warning
systems, would be useful to assess the validity of this ﬁnding
out of the Vidourle basin.
Furthermore, the broad results of this study give us some
clues about the real warning practices, and highlight some
questions that should be studied in a more pragmatic way:
1) kind of interpretation frameworks mobilized to assess the
situation 2) kind of stakeholders’ connections with action,
and kind of prises they have to reduce ﬂood impact (prise
is a French concept, used in warning studies (Chateauray-
naud and Torny, 1999), that could be translate by “grip” in
a metaphorical way, or “aﬀordance” (McGrenere and Ho,
2000) except that prises implies a human habilities to create
them); 3) How do the stakeholders process a scales changing
on available informations, i.e. how they try to make the MIs’
scales consistent with their own scales, in order to assess the
situation and to be able to undertake the relevant PA.
5 Conclusions
It appears that, in the Vidourle basin, the assessment world
and the action world do not exist anymore when we study
the concrete manner stakeholders process the warning. It
does not mean that stakeholders are interchangeable, but we
should study their practices within the same framework, in
order to identify the real diﬀerences/similarities in their ac-
tivities. Since the practicess of stakeholders appear to be
comparable, it becomes even more suitable to study them in
a deeply integrated approach. Pragmatic Sociology seems
to be a relevant frame for this new kind of warning studies,
since this approach allows to observe real practices, that are
missed with the classical approach.
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